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Abstract
Machine learning on encrypted data has received a lot of attention thanks to recent
breakthroughs in homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation. It
allows outsourcing computation to untrusted servers without sacrificing privacy of
sensitive data. We propose a practical framework to perform partially encrypted and
privacy-preserving predictions which combines adversarial training and functional
encryption. We first present a new functional encryption scheme to efficiently
compute quadratic functions so that the data owner controls what can be computed
but is not involved in the calculation: it provides a decryption key which allows one
to learn a specific function evaluation of some encrypted data. We then show how
to use it in machine learning to partially encrypt neural networks with quadratic
activation functions at evaluation time, and we provide a thorough analysis of
the information leaks based on indistinguishability of data items of the same
label. Last, since most encryption schemes cannot deal with the last thresholding
operation used for classification, we propose a training method to prevent selected
sensitive features from leaking, which adversarially optimizes the network against
an adversary trying to identify these features. This is interesting for several existing
works using partially encrypted machine learning as it comes with little reduction
on the model’s accuracy and significantly improves data privacy.
1 Introduction
As both public opinion and regulators are becoming increasingly aware of issues of data privacy, the
area of privacy-preserving machine learning has emerged with the aim of reshaping the way machine
learning deals with private data. Breakthroughs in fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [15, 18] and
secure multi-party computation (SMPC) [19, 39] have made computation on encrypted data practical
and implementations of neural networks to do encrypted predictions have flourished [34–36, 8, 13].
However, these protocols require the data owner encrypting the inputs and the parties performing the
computations to interact and communicate in order to get decrypted results, which we would like
to avoid in some cases, like spam filtering, for example, where the email receiver should not need
to be online for the email server to classify incoming email as spam or not. Functional encryption
(FE) [12, 32] in return does not need interaction to compute over encrypted data: it allows users to
receive in plaintext specific functional evaluations of encrypted data: for a function f , a functional
decryption key can be generated such that, given any ciphertext with underlying plaintext x, a user
can use this key to obtain f(x) without learning x or any other information than f(x). It stands in
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between traditional public key encryption, where data can only be directly revealed, and FHE, where
data can be manipulated but cannot be revealed: it allows the user to tightly control what is disclosed
about his data.
1.1 Use cases
Spam filtering. Consider the following scenario: Alice uses a secure email protocol which makes
use of functional encryption. Bob uses Alice’s public key to send her an email, which lands on Alice’s
email provider’s server. Alice gave the server keys that enable it to process the email and take a
predefined set of appropriate actions without her being online. The server could learn how urgent the
email is and decide accordingly whether to alert Alice. It could also detect whether the message is
spam and store it in the spam box right away.
Privacy-preserving enforcement of content policies Another use case could be to enable platforms,
such as messaging apps, to maintain user privacy through end-to-end encryption, while filtering out
content that is illegal or doesn’t adhere to policies the site may have regarding, for instance, abusive
speech or explicit images.
These applications are not currently feasible within a reasonable computing time, as the construction
of FE for all kinds of circuits is essentially equivalent to indistinguishable obfuscation [7, 21],
concrete instances of which have been shown insecure, let alone efficient. However, there exist
practical FE schemes for the inner-product functionality [1, 2] and more recently for quadratic
computations [6], that is usable for practical applications.
1.2 Our contributions
We introduce a new quadratic FE scheme which outperforms that of Baltico et al. [6] in terms of
complexity and show how to use it to build privacy preserving neural networks, which perform well
on simple image classification problems. Specifically, we show that the first layers of a polynomial
network can be run on encrypted inputs using this quadratic scheme, and that these layers can be
processed using adversarial training to improve privacy, so that their output, which is in plaintext,
cannot be used by adversaries to recover specific sensitive information at test time.
We provide an efficient implementation of this new FE scheme along with the adversarial procedure
used to reduce the information leakage that occurs in the semi-encrypted neural network because
the decrypted output is not directly the classification result but an intermediate layer (i.e., the neuron
outputs of the neural network before thresholding). This has been overlooked in other popular
encrypted classification schemes (even in FHE-based constructions like [20] and [15]), where the
argmax operation used to select the class label is made in clear, as it is either not possible with FE, or
quite inefficient with FHE and SMPC.
We demonstrate the practicality of our approach using a dataset inspired from MNIST [27], which is
made of images of digits written using two different fonts. We show how to perform classification of
the encrypted digit images in less than 3 seconds with over 97.7% accuracy while making the font
prediction a hard task for a whole set of adversaries.
This paper builds on a preliminary version available on the Cryptology ePrint Archive. All code and
implementations can be found on GitHub.
2 Background Knowledge
2.1 Quadratic and Polynomial Neural Networks
Polynomial neural networks are a class of networks which only use linear elements, like fully
connected linear layers, convolutions but with average pooling, and model activation functions with
polynomial approximations when not simply the square function. Despite these simplifications, they
have proved themselves satisfactorily accurate for relatively simple tasks ([20] learns on MNIST and
[5] on CIFAR10 [26]). The simplicity of the operations they build on guarantees good efficiency,
especially for the gradient computations, and works like [28] have shown that they can achieve
convergence rates similar to those of networks with non-linear activations.
In particular, they have been used for several early stage implementations in cryptography [20, 18, 14]
to demonstrate the usability of new protocols for machine learning. However, the argmax or other
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thresholding function present at the end of a classifier network to select the class among the output
neurons cannot be conveniently handled, so several protocol implementations (among which ours)
run polynomial networks on encrypted inputs, but take the argmax over the decrypted output of the
network. This results in potential information leakage which could be maliciously exploited.
2.2 Functional Encryption
Functional encryption extends the notion of public key encryption where one uses a public key pk
and a secret key sk to respectively encrypt and decrypt some data. More precisely, pk is still used
to encrypt data, but for a given function f , sk can be used to derive a functional decryption key
dkf which will be shared to users so that they can decrypt f(x) but not x. In particular, someone
having access to dkf cannot learn anything about x other than f(x). Note also that functions cannot
be composed, since the decryption happens within the function evaluation. A formal definition of
functional encryption is provided in Appendix A.1.
Perfect correctness. Perfect correctness is achieved in functional encryption: ∀x ∈ X , f ∈ F ,
Pr[Dec(dkf , ct) = f(x)] = 1, where dkf ← KeyGen(msk, f) and ct← Enc(pk, x). Note that this
property is a very strict condition, which is not satisfied by exisiting fully homomorphic encryption
schemes (FHE), such as [16, 22].
2.3 Indistinguishability and security
To assess the security of our framework, we first consider the FE scheme security and make sure
that we cannot learn anything more than what the function is supposed to output given an encryption
of x. Second, we analyze how sensitive the output f(x) is with respect to the private input x. For
both studies, we will rely on indistinguishability [23], a classical security notion which can be
summed up in the following game: an adversary provides two input items to the challenger (here our
FE algorithm), and the challenger chooses one item to be encrypted, run computation on it before
returning the output. The adversary should not be able to detect which input was used. This is known
as IND-CPA security in cryptography and a formal definition of it can be found in Appendix A.2.
We will first prove that our quadratic FE scheme achieves IND-CPA security, then, we will use a
relaxed version of indistinguishability to measure the FE output sensitivity. More precisely, we
will make the hypothesis that our input data X can be used to predict public features ypub but also
sensitive private features ypriv. Our quadratic FE scheme q aims at predicting ypub and an adversary
would rather like to infer ypriv. In this case, the security game consists in the adversary providing
two inputs (x0, x1) labelled with the same ypub but a different ypriv and then trying to distinguish
which one was selected by the challenger, given its output q(xb), b ∈ {0, 1}. One way to do this is to
measure the ability of an adversary to predict ypriv for items which all belong to the same ypub class.
In particular, note that we do not consider approaches based on input reconstruction (as done by [17])
because in many cases, the adversary is not interested in reconstructing the whole input, but rather
wants to get insights into specific features.
Another way to see this problem is that we want the sensitive feature ypriv to be independent from
the decrypted output q(x) (which is a proxy to the prediction), given the true public label ypub. This
independence notion is known as separation and is used as a fairness criterion in [9] if the sensitive
features can be misused for discrimination.
3 Our Context for Private Inference
3.1 Classifying in two directions
We are interested in specific types of datasets (~xi)i=1,...,n which have public labels ypub but also
private ones ypriv. Moreover, these different types of labels should be entangled, meaning that they
should not be easily separable, unlike the color and the shape of an object in an image for example
which can be simply separated. For example, in the spam filtering use case mentioned above, ypub
would be a spam flag, and ypriv would be some marketing information highlighting areas of interest
of the email recipient like technology, culture, etc. In addition, to simplify our analysis, we assume
that classes are balanced for all types of features, and that features are independent from each other
given the input: ∀~x, P (ypub, ypriv|~x) = P (ypub|~x)P (ypriv|~x). To illustrate our approach in the case
of image recognition, we propose a synthetic dataset inspired by MNIST which consists of 60 000
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grey scaled images of 28 × 28 pixels representing digits using two fonts and some distortion, as
shown in Figure 1. Here, the public feature ypub is the digit on the image and the private one ypriv is
the font used to draw it.
Figure 1: Artificial dataset inspired from MNIST with two types of labels.
We define two tasks: a main task which tries to predict ypub using a partially-encrypted polynomial
neural network with functional encryption, and a collateral task which is performed by an adversary
who tries to leverage the output of the FE encrypted network at test time to predict ypriv. Our goal
is to perform the main task with high accuracy while making the collateral one as bad as random
predictions. In terms of indistinguishability, given a dataset with the same digit drawn, it should be
infeasible to detect the used font.
3.2 Equivalence with a Quadratic Functional Encryption scheme
We now introduce our new framework for quadratic functional encryption and show that it can be
used to partially encrypt a polynomial network.
3.2.1 Functional Encryption for Quadratic Polynomials
We build an efficient FE scheme for the set of quadratic functions defined as Fn,Bx,By,Bq ⊂
{q : [−Bx, Bx]n × [−By, By]n → Z}, where q is described as a set of bounded coefficients
{qi,j ∈ [−Bq, Bq]}i,j∈[n] and for all vectors (~x, ~y), we have q(~x, ~y) =
∑
i,j∈[n] qi,jxiyj .A complete
version of our scheme can be found in Appendix B (Figure 10), but we present below the main ideas.
First note that we use bilinear groups, i.e., a set of prime-order groups G1, G2 and GT together
with a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT called pairing which satisfies e(ga1 , gb2) = e(g1, g2)ab for
any exponents a, b ∈ Z: one can compute quadratic polynomials in the exponent. Here, g1, g2 are
generators of G1 and G2 and gT := e(g1, g2) is a generator of the target group GT . A pair of vectors
(~s,~t) is first selected and constitutes the private key msk, while the public key is (g~s1, g
~t
2). Encrypting
(~x, ~y) roughly consists of masking g~x1 and g
~y
2 with g
~s
1 and g
~t
2, which allows any user to compute
g
q(~x,~y)−q(~s,~t)
T with for any quadratic function q, using the pairing. The functional decryption key for
a specific q is gq(~s,
~t)
T which allows to get g
q(~x,~y)
T . Last, taking the discrete logarithm gives access
to q(~x, ~y) (discrete logarithm for small exponents is easy). Security uses the fact that it is hard to
compute msk from pk (discrete logarithm for large exponents ~s,~t is hard to compute). More details
are given in Appendix B.11
Theorem 3.1 (Security, correctness and complexity) The FE scheme provided in Figure 10:
• is IND-CPA secure in the Generic Bilinear Group Model,
• verifies log(out) = q(~x, ~y) and satisfies perfect correctness,
• has a overall decryption complexity of 2n2(E + P ) + P +D,
where E, P and D respectively denote exponentiation, pairing and discrete logarithm complexities.
Our scheme outperforms previous schemes for quadratic FE with the same security assumption, like
the one from [6, Sec. 4] which achieves 3n2(E+P )+2P +D complexity and uses larger ciphertexts
and decryption keys. Note that the efficiency of the decryption can even be further optimized for
those quadratic polynomials used that are relevant to our application (see Section 3.2.2).
Computing the discrete logarithm for decryption. Our decryption requires computing discrete
logarithms of group elements in base gT , but contrary to previous works like [25] it is independent of
the ciphertext and the functional decryption key used to decrypt. This allows to pre-compute values
and dramatically speeds-up decryption.
1Note that we only present a simplified scheme here. In particular, the actual encryption is randomized,
which is necessary to achieve IND-CPA security.
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3.2.2 Equivalence of the FE scheme with a Quadratic Network
We classify data which can be represented as a vector ~x ∈ [0, B]n (in our case, the size B = 255,
and the dimension n = 784) and we first build models (qi)i∈[`] for each label i ∈ [`], such that our
prediction ypub for ~x is argmaxi∈[`] qi(~x).
Quadratic polynomial on Rn. The most straightforward way to use our FE scheme would be for
us to learn a model (Qi)i∈[`] ∈ (Rn×n)`, which we would then round onto integers, such that
qi(~x) = ~x
>Qi~x, ∀i ∈ [`]. This is a unnecessarily powerful model in the case of MNIST as it has `n2
parameters (n = 784), and the resulting number of pairings to compute would be unreasonably large.
Linear homomorphism. The encryption algorithm of our FE scheme is linearly homomorphic with
respect to the plaintext: given an encryption of (~x, ~y) under the secret key msk := (~s,~t), one can
efficiently compute an encryption of (~u>~x,~v>~y) under the secret key msk′ := (~u>~s,~v>~t) for any
linear combination ~u,~v (see proof in Appendix B.2). Any vector ~v is a column, and ~v> is a row.
Therefore, if q can be written q(~x, ~y) = (U~x)>M(V~y) for all (~x, ~y), with U,V ∈ Zd×np projection
matrices and M ∈ Zd×dp , it is more efficient to first compute the encryption of (U~x,V~y) from the
encryption of (~x, ~y), and then to apply the functional decryption on these ciphertexts, because their
underlying plaintexts are of reduced dimension d < n. This reduces the number of exponentiations
from 2n2 to 2dn and the number of pairing computations from 2n2 to 2d2 for a single qi. This is a
major efficiency improvement for small d, as pairings are the main bottleneck in the computation.
Projection and quadratic polynomial on Rd. We can use this and apply the quadratic polynomials
on projected vectors: we learn P ∈ Rn×d and (Qi)i∈[`] ∈
(
Rd×d
)`
, and our model is qi(~x) =
(P~x)>Qi(P~x), ∀i ∈ [`]. We only need 2`d2 pairings and since the same P is used for all qi, we only
compute once the encryption of P~x from the encryption of ~x. Better yet, we can also perform the
pairings only once, and then compute the scores by exponentiating with different coefficients the
same results of the pairings, thus only requiring 2d2 pairing evaluations, independently of `.
Degree 2 polynomial network, with one hidden layer. To further reduce the number of pairings,
we actually limit ourselves to diagonal matrices, and thus rename Qi to Di. We find that the gain
in efficiency associated with only computing 2d pairings is worth the small drop in accuracy. The
resulting model is actually a polynomial network of degree 2 with one hidden layer of d neurons and
the activation function is the square. In the following experiments we take d = 40.
Our final encrypted model can thus be written as qi(~x) = (P~x)>Di(P~x),∀i ∈ [`], where we add a
bias term to ~x by replacing it with ~x = (1 x1 . . . xn).
Full network. The result of the quadratic (qi(~x))i∈[`] (i.e., of the private quadratic network) is now
visible in clear. As mentioned above, we cannot compose this block several times as it contains
decryption, so this is currently the best that we can have as an encrypted computation with FE. Instead
of simply applying the argmax to the cleartext output of this privately-evaluated quadratic network to
get the label, we observe that adding more plaintext layers on top of it helps improving the overall
accuracy of the main task. We have therefore a neural network composed of a private and a public
part, as illustrated in Figure 2.
3.3 Threat of Collateral Learning
An adversary having a read access to the main task classification process could leverage the output of
the quadratic network to try to learn the font used on ciphered images. To do this, all that is needed is
to train another network on top of the quadratic network so that it learns to predict the font, assuming
some access to labeled samples (which is the case if the adversary encrypts itself images and provides
them to the main task at evaluation time). Note that in this case the private network is not updated by
the collateral network as we assume it is only provided in read access after the main task is trained.
Figure 3 summarizes the setting.
We implemented this scenario using as adversary a neural network composed of a first layer acting
as a decompression step where we increase the number of neurons from 10 back to 28 × 28 and
add on top of it a classical2 convolutional neural network (CNN). This structure is reminiscent of
autoencoders [38] where the bottleneck is the public output of the private net and the challenge of
2https://github.com/pytorch/examples/blob/master/mnist/main.py
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Figure 2: Semi-encrypted net-
work using quadratic FE.
Figure 3: Semi-encrypted network with an adversary trying
to recover private features from the private quadratic network.
this autoencoder is to correctly memorize the public feature while forgetting the private one. What
we observed is striking: in less than 10 epochs, the collateral network leverage the 10 public neurons
output and achieve 93.5% accuracy for the font prediction. As expected, it gets even worse when
the adversary is assessed with the indistinguishability criterion because in that case the adversary
can work on a dataset where only a specific digit is represented: this reduces the variability of the
samples and makes it easier to distinguish the font; the probability of success is indeed of 96.9%.
We call collateral learning this phenomenon of learning unexpected features and will show in the
next section how to implement counter-measures to this threat in order to improve privacy.
4 Defeating Collateral Learning
4.1 Reducing information leakage
Our first approach is based on the observation that we leak many bits of information. We first
investigate whether we can reduce the number of outputs of the privately-evaluted network, as
adding extra layers on top of the private network makes it no longer necessary to keep 10 of them.
Figure 4: Trade-off between main and collateral
accuracies depending on the private output size.
The intuition behind is that if the information
that is relevant to the main task can fit in less
than 10 neurons, then the extra neurons would
leak unnecessary information. We have there-
fore a trade-off between reducing too much and
losing desired information or keeping a too large
output and having an important leakage. We can
observe this through the respective accuracies
as it is shown in Figure 4, where the main and
adversarial networks are CNNs as in Section 3.3
with 10 epochs of training using 7-fold cross
validation. What we observe here is interesting:
the main task does not exhibit significant weak-
nesses even with size 3 where we drop to 97.1%
which is still very good although 2% under the
best accuracy. In return, the collateral accuracy
starts to significantly decrease when output size
is below 7. At size 4, it is only 76.4% on aver-
age so 18% less than the baseline. We will keep
an output size of 3 or 4 for the next experiments to keep the main accuracy almost unchanged.
Another hyperparameter that we can consider is the weight compression: how many bits do we need
to represent the weights on the private networks layers? This is of interest for the FE scheme as we
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Pre-training: Initial phase where both tasks learn and strengthen before the joint optimization
Minimize Lpub(θq, θpub)
Minimize Lpriv(Frozen(θq), θpriv)
Semi-adversarial training: The joint optimization phase, where θpub and θpriv are updated depending on
the variations of θq and θq is optimized to reduce the loss L = Lpub − αLpriv
Minimize Lpub(Frozen(θq), θpub)
Minimize Lpriv(Frozen(θq), θpriv)
Minimize L = Lpub(θq,Frozen(θpub))− αLpriv(θq,Frozen(θpub))
Recover phase: Both tasks recover from the perturbations induced by the adversarial phase, θq does not
change anymore
Minimize Lpub(Frozen(θq), θpub)
Minimize Lpriv(Frozen(θq), θpriv)
Figure 5: Our semi-adversarial training scheme.
need to convert all weights to integers and those integers will be low provided that the compression
rate is high. Small weight integers mean that the output of the private network has a relatively low
amplitude and can be therefore efficiently decrypted using discrete logarithm. We managed to express
all weights and even the input image using 4 bit values with limited impact on the main accuracy and
almost none on the collateral one. Details about compression can be found in Appendix C.1.
4.2 Adversarial training
We propose a new approach to actively adapt against collateral learning. We use semi-adversarial
training and optimize simultaneously the main objective and the opposite of the collateral objective
for a given adversary. The function that we want to minimize at each iteration step can be written:
min
θq
[min
θpub
Lpub(θq, θpub)− αmin
θpub
Lpriv(θq, θpub)].
This approach is inspired from [29] where the authors train some objective against nuisances parame-
ters to build a classifier independent from these nuisances. Private features leaking in our scheme can
indeed be considered to be a nuisance. However, our approach goes one step further as we do not just
stack a network above another; our global network structure is fork-like: the common basis is the
private network and the two forks are the main and collateral classifiers. This allows us to have a
better classifier for the main task which is not as sensitive to the adversarial training as the scheme
exposed by [29, Figure 1]. One other difference is that the collateral classifier is a specific modeling
of an adversary, and we will discuss this in details in the next section. We define in Figure 5 the
3-step procedure used to implement this semi-adversarial training using partial back-propagation.
5 Experimental Results
Accurate main task and poor collateral results. In Figures 6 and 7 we show that the output size
has an important influence on the two tasks’ performances. For this experiment, we use α = 1.7 as
detailed in Appendix C.2, the adversary uses the same CNN as stated above and the main network is
a simple feed forward network (FFN) with 4 layers. We observe that both networks behave better
when the output size increases, but the improvement is not synchronous which makes it possible to
have a main task with high accuracy while the collateral task is still very inaccurate. In our example,
this corresponds to an output size between 3 and 5. Note that the collateral result is the accuracy
at the distinction task, i.e., the digit is fixed for the adversary which trains to distinguish two fonts
during a 50 epoch recover phase using 7-fold cross validation, after 50 epochs of semi-adversarial
training have been spent to reduce leakage from the private network.
Generalizing resistance against multiple adversaries. In practice, it is very likely that the adver-
sary will use a different model than the one against which the protection has been built. We have
therefore investigated how building resistance against a model M can provide resistance against other
models. Our empirical results tend to show that models with less parameters than M do not perform
well. In return, models with more parameters can behave better, provided that the complexity does
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Figure 6: Influence of the output size on the main
task accuracy with adversarial training.
Figure 7: Influence of the output size on the col-
lateral task accuracy with adversarial training.
not get excessive for the considered task, because it would not provide any additional advantage and
would just lead to learning noise. In particular, the CNN already mentioned above seems to be a
sufficiently complex model to resist against a wide range of feed forward (FFN) and convolutional
networks, as illustrated in Figure 8 where the measure used is indistinguishability of the font for a
fixed digit. This study is not exhaustive as the adversary can change the activation function (here we
use relu) or even the training parameters (optimizer, batch size, dropout, etc.), but these do not seem
to provide any decisive advantage.
Figure 8: Collateral accuracy depending of the
adversarial network complexity seen as the log of
the number of parameters.
Linear Ridge Regression 53.5± 0.5%
Logistic Regression 52.5± 0.6%
Quad. Discriminant Analysis 54.9± 0.3%
SVM (RBF kernel) 57.9± 0.4%
Gaussian Process Classifier 53.8± 0.3%
Gaussian Naive Bayes 53.2± 0.5%
K-Neighbors Classifier 58.1± 0.7%
Decision Tree Classifier 56.8± 0.4%
Random Forest Classifier 58.9± 0.2%
Gradient Boosting Classifier 58.9± 0.2%
Figure 9: Accuracy on the distinction task for
different adversarial learning models.
We also assessed the resistance to a large range of other models from the sklearn library [33] and
report the collateral accuracy in Table 9. As can be observed, some models such as k-nearest
neighbors or random forests perform better compared to neural networks, even if their accuracy
remains relatively low. One reason can be that they operate in a very different manner compared
to the model on which the adversarial training is performed: k-nearest neighbors for example just
considers distances between points.
Runtime. Training in semi-adversarial mode can take quite a long time depending on the level
of privacy one wants to achieve. However, the runtime during the test phase is much faster, it is
dominated by the FE scheme part which can be broken down to 4 steps: functional key generation,
encryption of the input, evaluation of the function and discrete logarithm. Regarding encryption and
evaluation, the main overhead comes from the exponentiations and pairings which are implemented in
the crypto library charm [3]. In return, the discrete logarithm is very efficient thanks to the reduction
of the weights amplitude detailed in Figure 4.1.
Functional key generation 94± 5ms Evaluation time 2.97± 0.07s
Encryption time 12.1± 0.3 s Discrete logarithms time 24± 9ms
Table 1: Average runtime for the FE scheme using a 2,7 GHz Intel Core i7 and 16GB of RAM.
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6 Conclusion
We have shown that functional encryption can be used for practical applications where machine
learning is used on sensitive data. We have raised awareness about the potential information leakage
when not all the network is encrypted and have proposed semi-adversarial training as a solution to
prevent targeted sensitive features from leaking for a vast family of adversaries.
However, it remains an open problem to provide privacy-preserving methods for all features except
the public ones as they can be hard to identify in advance. On the cryptography side, extension of the
range of functions supported in functional encryption would help increase provable data privacy, and
adding the ability to hide the function evaluated would be of interest for sensitive neural networks.
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A Functional Encryption and crypto tools
A.1 Formal definition of Functional Encryption
Functional encryption relies on a pair of keys like in public key encryption: a master secret key msk
and a public key pk. The public key pk can be shared and is used to encrypt the data, while the master
secret key msk is used to build functional decryption keys dkf for f ∈ F . A user having access to c
an encryption of x with pk and to dkf can learn f(x) but can’t learn anything else about x.
We give the definition of Functional Encryption, originally defined in [12, 32].
Definition A.1 (Functional Encryption) A functional encryption scheme FE for a set of functions
F ⊆ X → Y is a tuple of PPT algorithms FE = (SetUp,KeyGen,Enc,Dec) defined as follows.
SetUp(1λ,F) takes as input a security parameter 1λ, the set of functions F , and outputs a master
secret key msk and a public key pk.
KeyGen(msk, f) takes as input the master secret key and a function f ∈ F , and outputs a functional
decryption key dkf .
Enc(pk, x) takes as input the public key pk and a message x ∈ X , and outputs a ciphertext ct.
Dec(dkf , ct) takes as input a functional decryption key dkf and a ciphertext ct, and returns an
output y ∈ Y ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ is a special rejection symbol.
A.2 IND-CPA security
With notations of Appendix A.1, for any stateful adversary A and any functional encryption scheme
FE, we define the following advantage.
AdvFEA (λ) := Pr
β′ = β :
(pk,msk)← SetUp(1λ,F)
(x0, x1)← AKeyGen(msk,·)(pk)
β
$← {0, 1}, ct← Enc(pk, xβ)
β′ ← AKeyGen(msk,·)(ct)
− 12 ,
with the restriction that all queries f that A makes to key generation algorithm KeyGen(msk, ·) must
satisfy f(x0) = f(x1).
We say FE is IND-CPA secure if for all PPT adversaries A, AdvFEA (λ) = negl(λ)3.
A.3 Bilinear Groups
Our FE scheme uses bilinear (or pairing) groups, whose use in cryptography has been introduced
by [11, 24]. More precisely, given λ a security parameter, let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of
prime order p (for a 2λ-bit prime p) and g1 and g2 their generators, respectively. The application
e : G1 × G2 → GT is a pairing if it is efficiently computable, non-degenerated, and bilinear:
e(gα1 , g
β
2 ) = e(g1, g2)
αβ for any α, β ∈ Zp. Additionally, we define gT := e(g1, g2) which spans the
group GT of prime order p.
We will denote by GGen a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm that on input 1λ returns a
description PG = (G1,G2, p, g1, g2, e) of an asymmetric bilinear group. For convenience, given s =
1, 2 or T , n ∈ N and vectors ~u := (u1 . . . un) ∈ Znp , ~v ∈ Znp , we denote by g~us := (gu1s . . . guns ) ∈ Gns
and e(g~u1 , g
~v
2) =
∏
i=1 e(g1, g2)
ui·vi = e(g1, g2)~u·~v ∈ GT , where ~u · ~v is the inner product, i.e.
~u · ~v := ∑ni=1 uivi.
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SetUp(1λ,Fn,Bx,By,Bf ):
PG := (G1,G2, p, g1, g2, e)← GGen(1λ), ~s,~t $← Znp , msk := (~s,~t), pk :=
(
PG, g~s1, g~t2
)
Return (pk,msk).
Enc
(
pk, (~x, ~y)
)
:
γ
$← Zp, W $← GL2, for all i ∈ [n], ~ai := (W−1)>
(
xi
γsi
)
,~bi := W
(
yi
−ti
)
Return ct :=
(
gγ1 , {g~ai1 , g
~bi
2 }i∈[n]
)
∈ G1 × (G21 ×G22)n
KeyGen(msk, q):
Return dkf :=
(
g
q(~s,~t)
2 , q
)
∈ G2 ×Fn,Bx,By,Bq .
Dec
(
pk, ct :=
(
gγ1 , {g~ai1 , g
~bi
2 }i∈[n]
)
, dkq :=
(
g
q(~s,~t)
2 , q
))
:
out := e(gγ1 , g
q(~s,~t)
2 ) ·
∏
i,j∈[n] e
(
g~ai1 , g
~bj
2
)qi,j
Return log(out) ∈ Z.
Figure 10: Our functional encryption scheme for quadratic polynomials.
B Our Quadratic Functional Encryption Scheme
B.1 Proofs of IND-CPA security ans correctness
Proof of Security
To prove security of our scheme, we use the Generic Bilinear Group Model, which captures the
fact that no attacks can make use of the representation of group elements. For convenience, we use
Maurer’s model [30], where a third party implements the group and gives access to the adversary via
handles, providing also equality checking. This is an alternative, but equivalent, formulation of the
Generic Group Model, as originally introduced in [31, 37].
We prove security in two steps: first, we use a master theorem from [6] that relates the security in the
Generic Bilinear Group model to a security in a symbolic model. Second, we prove security in the
symbolic model. Let us now explain the symbolic model (the next paragraph is taken verbatim from
[4]).
In the symbolic model, the third party does not implement an actual group, but keeps track of abstract
expressions. For example, consider an experiment where values x, y are sampled from Zp and the
adversary gets handles to gx and gy . In the generic model, the third party will choose a group of order
p, for example (Zp,+), will sample values x, y ←R Zp and will give handles to x and y. On the
other hand, in the symbolic model the sampling won’t be performed and the third party will output
handles to X and Y , where X and Y are abstract variables. Now, if the adversary asks for equality
of the elements associated to the two handles, the answer will be negative in the symbolic model,
since abstract variable X is different from abstract variable Y , but there is a small chance the equality
check succeeds in the generic model (only when the sampling of x and y coincides).
To apply the master theorem, we first need to change the distribution of the security game to
ensure that the public key, challenge ciphertext, and functional decryption keys only contain group
elements whose exponent is a polynomial evaluated on uniformly random values in Zp (this is called
polynomially induced distributions in [6, Definition 10], and previously in [10]). We show that this is
possible with only a negligible statistical change in the distribution of the adversary view.
3In cryptography, the security parameter λ is a measure of the probability with which an adversary can break
the scheme. λ or 1λ means that the probability of breaking the scheme is 2−λ.
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After applying the master theorem from [6], we prove the security in the symbolic model (cf.
Appendix D.1), which simply consists of checking that an algebraic condition on the scheme in
satisfied.
Theorem B.1 (IND-CPA Security in the Generic Bilinear Group Model) For any PPT adver-
sary A that performs at most Q group operations against the functional encryption scheme described
on 10, we have, in the generic bilinear group model:
AdvFEA (λ) ≤
12 · (6n+ 3 +Q+Q′)2 + 1
p
,
where Q′ is the number of queries to KeyGen(msk, ·).
The proof of this result is quite technical and can be found in the dedicated Appendix D.
Proof of Correctness
For all i, j ∈ [n], we have:
e(g~ai1 , g
~bj
2 ) = g
~ai·~bj
T = g
xiyj−γsitj
T
since
~ai ·~bj =
(
(W−1)>
(
xi
γsi
))>
·
(
W
(
yj
−tj
))
=
(
xi
γsi
)>
W−1W
(
yj
−tj
)
= xiyj − γsitj .
Therefore we have:
out = e(gγ1 , g
q(~s,~t)
2 ) ·
∏
i,j
e(g~ai1 , g
~bi
2 )
qi,j = g
γq(~s,~t)
T · g
∑
i,j qi,jxiyj−γqi,jsitj
T
= g
γq(~s,~t)
T · gq(~x,~y)−γq(~s,
~t)
T = g
q(~x,~y)
T .
Proof of Complexity
The complexity can be inferred from the decryption phase as detailed in Figure 10 and we compare
this with previous quadratic FE schemes in Figure 11.
FE scheme ct dkf Dec Assumption
[6, Sec. 3] G6n+11 ×G6n+12 G1 ×G2 6n2(E1 + P ) + 2P SXDH, 3PDDH
[6, Sec. 4] G2n+11 ×G2n+12 G21 3n2(E1 + P ) + 2P GGM
Ours G2n+11 ×G2n2 G2 2n2(E1 + P ) + P GGM
Figure 11: Performance comparison of FE for quadratic polynomials. E1 and P denote exponentiation
in G1 and pairing evaluation, respectively. Decryption additionally requires solving a discrete
logarithm but this computational overhead is the same for all schemes and is therefore omitted here.
B.2 Detailed equivalence of the FE scheme with a neural network
Proof of Linear Homomorphism
For all (~x, ~y) ∈ Znp × Znp , and (~u,~v) ∈ Znp × Znp , given an encryption of (~x, ~y) under the public
key pk := (g~s1, g
~t
2), one can efficiently compute an encryption of (~u
>~x,~v>~y) under the public key
pk′ := (g~u
>~s
1 , g
~v>~t
2 ). Indeed, given
Enc(pk, (~x, ~y)) := (gγ1 , {g~ai1 , g
~bi
2 }i∈[n]),
and ~u,~v ∈ Znp , one can efficiently compute:
(gγ1 , g
∑
i∈[n] ui·~ai
1 , g
∑
i∈[n] vi·~bi
2 ),
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which is Enc(pk′, (~u>~x,~v>~y)), since:∑
i∈[n]
ui · ~ai =
∑
i∈[n]
ui · (W−1)>
(
xi
γsi
)
= (W−1)>
( ∑
i∈[n] ui · xi
γ
∑
i∈[n] ui · si
)
= (W−1)>
(
~u>~x
γ~u>~s
)
.
Similarly, we have: ∑
i∈[n]
vi ·~bi =
∑
i∈[n]
vi ·W
(
yi
−ti
)
= W
(
~v>~y
−~v>~t
)
.
C Additional results
C.1 Influence of weight compression on the network performance
We show here that we can manage to compress significantly the network weights in order to have
a very fast discrete logarithm without modifying the results and conclusions made throughout the
article. The main and collateral model follow the same CNN structure as stated above, and the
collateral accuracy is reported after 10 epochs of training.
Main accuracy with compression 97.72± 0.30 %
Collateral accuracy with compression 55.27± 0.41 %
Table 2: Impact of weight compression on the main and collateral accuracies
C.2 Influence of alpha during adversarial training
To choose the best value for α, we have chosen an output size of 4 which allows us to keep a very
high main accuracy while reducing significantly the collateral one, as shown in Figure 4. We observe
that the semi-adversarial training does not affect much the main accuracy for a large range of values
for α, while its impact on the collateral accuracy is decisive. Figure 12 illustrates the role of α and
justify our choice of α = 1.7. For this experiment, we have chosen for both networks a simple feed
forward with a hidden layer of 32 neurons.
Figure 12: Trade-off between the main and collateral tasks accuracies as a function of α
D Security proof of our FE scheme
Proof. For any experiment Exp, adversary A, and security parameter λ ∈ N, we use the notation:
AdvExp(A) := Pr[1 ← Exp(1λ,A)], where the probability is taken over the random coins of Exp
and A.
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Exp1(1
λ,A): KeyGen(msk, f):
(G1,G2, p, g1, g2, e)← GGen(1λ), ~s,~t $← Znp return (gf(~s,
~t)
2 , f).
a, b, c, d
$← Zp, set PG := (G1,G2, p, gad−bc1 , g2, e)
msk := (~s,~t), pk :=
(
PG, g(ad−bc)~s1 , g~t2
)(
(~x(0), ~y(0)), (~x(1), ~y(1))
)
← AKeyGen(msk,·)(pk)
β
$← {0, 1}, γ $← Zp
for all i ∈ [n], ~ai :=
(
d −c
−b a
)(
x
(β)
i
γsi
)
,~bi :=
(
a b
c d
)(
y
(β)
i−tj
)
ct =:
(
g
γ(ad−bc)
1 , {g~ai1 , g
~bi
2 }i∈[n]
)
β′ ← AKeyGen(msk,·)(pk, ct)
Return 1 if β′ = β and for all queried f , f(~x(0), ~y(0)) = f(~x(1), ~y(1)).
Figure 13: Experiment Exp1, for the proof of Theorem B.1.
While we want to prove the security result in the real experiment Exp0, in which the adversary has to
guess β, we slightly modify it into the hybrid experiment Exp1, described in 13: we write the matrix
W
$← GL2 used in the challenge ciphertext as W :=
(
a b
c d
)
, chosen from the beginning. Then
W−1 = 1ad−bc
(
d −b
−c a
)
.
The only difference with the IND-CPA security game as defined in Appendix A.2, is that we change
the generator g1
$← G∗1 into gad−bc1 for a, b, c, d $← Zp, which only changes the distribution of
the game by a statistical distance of at most 3p (this is obtained by computing the probability that
ad− bc = 0 when a, b, c, d $← Zp). Thus,
AdvFEA (λ) = Adv0(A) ≤ Adv1(A) +
3
p
.
Note that in Exp1, the public key, the challenge ciphertext and the functional decryption keys only
contain group elements whose exponents are polynomials evaluated on random inputs (as opposed to
gW
−1
1 , for instance). This is going to be helpful for the next step of the proof, which uses the generic
bilinear group model.
Next, we make the generic bilinear group model assumption, which intuitively says that no PPT
adversary can exploit the structure of the bilinear group to perform better attacks than generic
adversaries. That is, we have (with Exp2 defined in 14):
max
PPTA
(
Adv1(A)
)
= max
PPTA
(
Adv2(A)
)
.
In this experiment, we denote by ∅ the empty list, by append(L, x) the addition of an element x to
the list L, and for any i ∈ N, we denote by L[i] the i’th element of the list L if it exists (lists are
indexed from index 1 on), or ⊥ otherwise.
Thus, it suffices to show that for any PPT adversary A, Adv2(A) is negligible in λ. The experiment
Exp2 defined in Figure 14 falls into the general class of simple interactive decisional problems from
[6, Definition 14]. Thus, we can use their master theorem [6, Theorem 7], which, for our particular
case (setting the public key size N := 2n+ 2, the key size c = 1, the ciphertext size c∗ := 4n+ 1,
and degree d = 6 in [6, Theorem 7]) states that:
Adv2(A) ≤ 12 · (6n+ 3 +Q+Q
′)2
p
,
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Exp2(1
λ,A):
L1 = L2 = LT := ∅, Qsk := ∅, ~s,~t $← Znp , a, b, c, d $← Zp, append(L1, (ad − bc) · ~s),
append(L2,~t), β
$← {0, 1}(
(~x(0), ~y(0)), (~x(1), ~y(1))
)
← AOadd,Opair,Osk,Oeq(1λ, p)
Ochal
(
(~x(0), ~y(0)), (~x(1), ~y(1))
)
β′ ← AOadd,Opair,Osk,Oeq(1λ, p)
If β = β′, and for all f ∈ Qsk, f(~x(0), ~y(0)) = f(~x(1), ~y(1)), output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
Oadd(s ∈ {1, 2, T}, i, j ∈ N):
append(Ls, Ls[i] + Ls[j]).
Opair(i, j ∈ N):
append(LT , L1[i] · L2[j]).
Ochal
(
(~x(0), ~y(0)), (~x(1), ~y(1))
)
:
γ
$← Zp, append(L1, γ(ad− bc))
for all i ∈ [n], ~ai :=
(
d −c
−b a
)(
x
(β)
i
γsi
)
, append(L1,~ai), ~bi :=
(
a b
c d
)(
y
(β)
i−ti
)
,
append(L2,~bi).
Osk(f ∈ Fn,Bx,By,Bf ):
append(L2, f(~s,~t)), Qsk := Qsk ∪ {f}.
Oeq(s ∈ {1, 2, T}, i, j ∈ N):
Output 1 if Ls[i] = Ls[j], 0 otherwise
Figure 14: Experiment Exp2. Wlog. we assume no query contains indices i, j ∈ N that exceed the
size of the involved lists.
where Q′ is the number of queries to Osk, and Q is the number of group operations, that is, the
number of calls to oracles Oadd and Opair, provided the following algebraic condition is satisfied:
{M ∈ Z(3n+2)×(3n+Q′+1)p : Eq0(M)}
= {M ∈ Z(3n+2)×(3n+Q′+1)p : Eq1(M)},
where for all M, b ∈ {0, 1},
Eqb(M) :

1
(AD −BC)~S
(AD −BC)Γ
D~x(b) − ΓC~S
−B~x(b) + ΓA~S

>
M

1
~T
A~y(b) −B~T
C~y(b) −D~T
(f(~S, ~T ))f∈Qsk
 = 0,
where the equality is taken in the ring Zp[~S, ~T ,A,B,C,D,Γ], and 0 denotes the zero polynomial.
Intuitively, this condition captures the security at a symbolic level: it holds for schemes that are not
trivially broken. The latter means that computing a linear combination in the exponents of target
group elements that can be obtained from pk, the challenge ciphertext, and functional decryption
keys, does not break the security of the scheme. We prove this condition is satisfied in D.1 below. 
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Lemma D.1 (Symbolic Security) For any (~x(0), ~y(0)), (~x(1), ~y(1)) ∈ Z2np , and any set Qsk ⊆
Fn,Bx,By,Bf such that for all f ∈ Qsk, f(~x(0), ~y(0)) = f(~x(1), ~y(1)), we have:
{M ∈ Z(3n+2)×(3n+Q′+1)p : Eq0(M)}
= {M ∈ Z(3n+2)×(3n+Q′+1)p : Eq1(M)},
where for all M, b ∈ {0, 1},
Eqb(M) :

1
(AD −BC)~S
(AD −BC)Γ
D~x(b) − ΓC~S
−B~x(b) + ΓA~S

>
M

1
~T
A~y(b) −B~T
C~y(b) −D~T
(f(~S, ~T ))f∈Qsk
 = 0,
where the equality is taken in the ring Zp[~S, ~T ,A,B,C,D,Γ], and 0 denotes the zero polynomial.
Proof.Let b ∈ {0, 1}, and M ∈ Z(3n+2)×(3n+Q′+1)p that satisfies Eqb(M). We prove it also satisfies
Eq1−b(M). To do so, we use the following rules:
Rule 1 : for all P,Q,R ∈ Zp[~S, ~T ,A,B,C,D,Γ], with deg(P ) ≥ 1, if P · Q + R = 0 and R is
not a multiple of P , then Q = 0 and R = 0.
Rule 2 : for all P ∈ Zp[~S, ~T ,A,B,C,D,Γ], any variable X among the set {~S, ~T ,A,B,C,D,Γ},
and any x ∈ Zp, P = 0 implies P (X := x) = 0, where P (X := x) denotes the polynomial
P evaluated on X = x.
Evaluating Eqb(M) on B = D = 0 (using Rule 2), then using Rule 1 on P = CΓSiTj for all
i, j ∈ [n], we obtain that:
Mn+2+i

0
~T
0
0
(f(~S, ~T ))f∈Qsk
 = 0,
where Mn+2+i denotes the n+ 2 + i’th row of M.
Similarly, using Rule 1 on P = ΓASiTj for all i, j ∈ [n], we obtain that:
M2n+2+i

0
~T
0
0
(f(~S, ~T ))f∈Qsk
 = 0.
Thus, we have:
∀β ∈ {0, 1} :

0
0
0
D~x(β) − ΓC~S
−B~x(β) + ΓA~S

>
M

0
~T
0
0
(f(~S, ~T ))f∈Qsk
 = 0. (1)
Using Rule 1 on P = (AD −BC)SiBTj for all i, j ∈ [n] in the equation Eqb(M), we get that the
coefficient Mi+1,n+1+j = 0 for all i, j ∈ [n]. Similarly, using Rule 1 on P = (AD −BC)SiDTj
for all i, j ∈ [n], we get Mi+1,2n+1+j = 0 for all i, j ∈ [n]. Then, using Rule 1 on P =
(AD −BC)ΓBTj for all j ∈ [n], we get Mn+2,n+1+j = 0 for all j ∈ [n]. Finally, using Rule 1 on
P = (AD−BC)ΓDTj for all j ∈ [n], we get Mn+2,2n+1+j = 0 for all j ∈ [n]. Overall, we obtain:
∀β ∈ {0, 1} :

0
(AD −BC)~S
(AD −BC)Γ
0
0

>
M

0
0
A~y(β) −B~T
C~y(β) −D~T
0
 = 0. (2)
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We write: 
0
0
0
D~x(b) − ΓC~S
−B~x(b) + ΓA~S

>
M

0
0
A~y(b) −B~T
C~y(b) −D~T
0

=
∑
i,j∈[n]
(
Dx
(b)
i − ΓCSi
−Bx(b)i + ΓASi
)>
×
(
m
(1)
i,j
(
1 0
0 1
)
+m
(2)
i,j
(
1 0
0 0
)
+m
(3)
i,j
(
0 0
1 0
)
+m
(4)
i,j
(
0 1
0 0
))
×
(
Ay
(b)
j −BTj
Cy
(b)
j −DTj
)
Evaluating the equation Eqb(M) on C = D = 0 (by Rule 2), then using Rule 1 on P = ΓABSiTj
for all i, j ∈ [n], we obtain m(3)i,j = 0 for all i, j ∈ [n]. Evaluating the equation Eqb(M) on
A = B = 0 (by Rule 2), then using Rule 1 on P = ΓCDSiTj for all i, j ∈ [n], we obtain m(4)i,j = 0
for all i, j ∈ [n]. Evaluating the equation Eqb(M) on A = B = C = D = 1 (using Rule 2), then
using Rule 1 on P = ΓSiTj for all i, j ∈ [n], using the fact that m(3)i,j = m(4)i,j = 0 and (1), we obtain
m
(2)
i,j = 0 for all i, j ∈ [n]. Using Rule 1 on P = Γ(AD−BC)SiTj for all i, j ∈ [n] in the equation
Eqb(M), we obtain that for all i, j ∈ [n],
m
(1)
i,j = Mn+2

0
0
0
0
(fi,j)f∈Qsk
 ,
where Mn+2 is the n+ 2’th row of M.
Putting everything together, can write
0
0
0
D~x(b) − ΓC~S
−B~x(b) + ΓA~S

>
M

0
0
A~y(b) −B~T
C~y(b) −D~T
0

as
(AD −BC)Mn+2

0
0
0
0(
f(~x(b), ~y(b))− Γf(~s,~t))
f∈Qsk

= (AD −BC)Mn+2

0
0
0
0(
f(~x(1−b), ~y(1−b))− Γf(~s,~t))
f∈Qsk

=

0
0
0
D~x(1−b) − ΓC~S
−B~x(1−b) + ΓA~S

>
M

0
0
A~y(b) −B~T
C~y(b) −D~T
0
 (3)
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where we use the fact that for all f ∈ Qsk, we have the equality f(~x(b), ~y(b)) = f(~x(1−b), ~y(1−b)).
Evaluating equation Eqb(M) on A = B = D = 0 (by Rule 2), then using Rule 1 on ΓSiC for all
i ∈ [n], and using (1) and (3), we obtain that the coefficient Mn+2+i,1 = 0 for all i ∈ [n]. Evaluating
Eqb(M) on B = C = D = 0 (by Rule 2), then using Rule 1 on ΓSiA for all i ∈ [n], and using (1)
and (3), we obtain that the coefficient M2n+2+i,1 = 0 for all i ∈ [n]. Thus, we have:
∀β ∈ {0, 1} :

0
0
0
D~x(β) − ΓC~S
−B~x(β) + ΓA~S

>
M

1
0
0
0
0
 = 0. (4)
Evaluating equation Eqb(M) on A = C = D = 0 (by Rule 2), then using Rule 1 on BTj for all
i ∈ [n], and using (3), we obtain that the coefficient M1,n+1+j = 0 for all j ∈ [n]. Evaluating
Eqb(M) on A = B = C = 0 (by Rule 2), then using Rule 1 on DTj for all j ∈ [n], and using (3),
we obtain that the coefficient M1,2n+1+j = 0 for all j ∈ [n]. Thus, we have:
∀β ∈ {0, 1} :

1
0
0
0
0

>
M

0
0
A~y(β) −B~T
C~y(β) −D~T
0
 = 0. (5)
Overall, we have:
Eqb(M) :

1
(AD −BC)~S
(AD −BC)Γ
D~x(b) − ΓC~S
−B~x(b) + ΓA~S

>
M

1
~T
A~y(b) −B~T
C~y(b) −D~T
(f(~S, ~T ))f∈Qsk
 = 0
which implies the following relation, under (1),(2),(4),(5)
1
(AD −BC)~S
(AD −BC)Γ
0
0

>
M

1
~T
0
0
(f(~S, ~T ))f∈Qsk

+

0
0
0
D~x(b) − ΓC~S
−B~x(b) + ΓA~S

>
M

0
0
A~y(b) −B~T
C~y(b) −D~T
0
 = 0
and then, under (3) 
1
(AD −BC)~S
(AD −BC)Γ
0
0

>
M

1
~T
0
0
(f(~S, ~T ))f∈Qsk

+

0
0
0
D~x(1−b) − ΓC~S
−B~x(1−b) + ΓA~S

>
M

0
0
A~y(1−b) −B~T
C~y(1−b) −D~T
0
 = 0.
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Under (1),(2),(4),(5), this implies
Eq1−b(M) :

1
(AD −BC)~S
(AD −BC)Γ
D~x(1−b) − ΓC~S
−B~x(1−b) + ΓA~S

>
M

1
~T
A~y(1−b) −B~T
C~y(1−b) −D~T
(f(~S, ~T ))f∈Qsk
 = 0

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